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ABSTRACT 
The recent financial crisis highlights gaps in the regulation of fi-
nancial markets.  This Essay introduces the contributions of some of 
the participants in the 2009 Seton Hall Law Review Symposium ex-
ploring the future of financial markets regulation.  Their contribu-
tions examine causes of the recent crisis, mechanisms that may ad-
dress these concerns, and unexplored concerns that impact effective 
regulation of financial markets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the turmoil of the recent financial crisis, or “the 
Great Recession,”1 Congress adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act).2  
Since the inception of the financial crisis, businesses, employees, in-
dividual and institutional investors, charitable institutions, and city 
and state investment funds experienced significant economic losses.
3
  
As a result of these losses, questions emerged regarding the funda-
mental structure of our national financial markets regulatory frame-
work and the international regulatory agenda.
4
 
Despite having one of the most advanced regulatory frameworks 
in the world and highly-sophisticated market participants, a series of 
debilitating events unfolded in the United States financial services 
sector beginning in 2006.  These events threatened the stability of the 
National economy.
5
  The years leading to the onset of the financial 
crisis witnessed exponential growth in the markets for exotic invest-
ment products such as credit default swaps, collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs), credit linked notes, and other derivatives.
6
  As residen-
tial property and related asset-backed securities began to decline in 
value, financial market participants whose businesses invested in 
 
 1 Krishna Guha, US Faces Worst Recession in 26 Years, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/232eb4de-9e20-11dd-bdde-000077b07658.html.   
 2 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203 (2010). 
 3 See John Hechinger & Craig Karmin, Harvard Hit by Loss as Crisis Spreads to Col-
leges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, at A1; Renae Merle, Wall Street’s Final ‘08 Toll: $6.9 Tril-
lion Wiped Out, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2009, at A1; Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Loses 533,000 Jobs 
in Biggest Drop Since 1974, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5 2008, at A1;  Credit Crisis Could Cost Nearly 
$1 Trillion, IMF Predicts,  N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-imf.3.11771908.html. 
 4 See Jackie Calmes, Financial Crisis May Give Rise To New Era of Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at A15. 
 5 Guha, supra note 1. 
 6 See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 81 U. 
COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 20–23), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1572467_code1440806.pdf?abst
ractid=1572467&mirid=2; Matthew Philips, The Monster that Ate Wall Street: How ‘Credit 
Default Swaps’—an Insurance Against Bad Loans—Turned from a Smart Bet into a Killer, 
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46.  See also Credit Default Swaps and the Financial Crisis: “In-
terconnectedness” and Beyond—The Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Prof. Henry T. C. 
Hu), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h81015/Hu.pdf; Ed-
mund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
24, 2008, at B1. 
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these products faced significant losses.
7
  The losses quickly reverbe-
rated across the nation.  As easily as capital flows across national bor-
ders and into other jurisdictions, the troubles of the crisis soon 
threatened the financial health of sovereign nations, significant for-
eign financial institutions, and ultimately, the global economy.
8
 
Some scholars posit that enterprise and systemic risk manage-
ment failures at individual domestic and international businesses 
were among the chief causes of the crisis.
9
  Other scholars explore 
American legal standards governing the personal liability of directors 
and officers and compare this doctrine with corporate governance 
policies adopted in other jurisdictions.
10
  Theorists also explore ad-
vances in virtual communications technology and the impact of evolv-
ing technology on the relationship between shareholders and man-
agers of a company.
11
 
The government and the private sector responded to the events 
of the crisis by engaging in a form of triage, sewing together a pat-
chwork of hurriedly arranged financing structures.
12
  Some scholars 
describe these arrangements as “regulation by deal.”
13
  Commentators 
argue that, once the crisis no longer presents an imminent threat, 
these arrangements may encourage private parties to abuse the ma-
nagerial authority granted to boards of directors under corporations 
laws or adopt liberal interpretations of laws affecting distressed com-
panies facing insolvency.
14
  Still other scholars examine the impor-
 
 7 See, e.g., Peter Robison & Yalman Onaran, Fuld's Subprime Bets Fueled Profit, Un-
dermined Lehman (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, (Sept. 15, 2008, 6:19 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiETiKXNbDVE.  
 8 Guha, supra note 1. 
 9 See, e.g., Michelle Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1323 (2010). 
 10 See, e.g., Wulf Kaal and Richard Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Stan-
dard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 
40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433 (2010). 
 11 See, e.g., Lisa Fairfax, Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1367 (2010). 
 12 See Joan Heminway, Federal Interventions in Private Enterprise in the United States: 
Their Genesis in and Effects on Corporate Finance Instruments and Transactions, 40 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1487 (2010); J.W. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: Gov-
ernment-Controlled Corporations as a Mechanism for Rent Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1521 (2010). 
 13 Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response 
to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 463 (2009). 
 14 See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 12. 
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tance of adopting a coordinated international initiative to address the 
antecedents to the recent crisis and to prevent future crises.
15
 
 The events of the crisis illustrate the threat of systemic risk 
created by failing significant financial institutions and the efforts to 
turn back a tidal wave of calamity in financial markets.  In some in-
stances, firms escaped insolvency by seeking federal government aid 
in the form of loans or capital investments.
16
  In other instances, firms 
that faced insolvency engaged in mergers, acquisitions, or disposi-
tions to avoid collapse.
17
 
Systemic risk, triggered by the failure of a significant financial 
institution or several such institutions, threatens the stability of the 
national economy.
18
  Many commentators suggest that careful over-
sight of systemically significant financial institutions reduces systemic 
risk.
19
  The recently adopted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act reflects Congress’s efforts to identify sys-
temically significant financial institutions and to improve the regula-
tory oversight of these institutions.
20
   
 
 15 See Eric Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for the Harmoniza-
tion and Centralization of International Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 
(2010). 
 16 Kenneth Ayotte & David Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 
469–70 (2010). 
 17 See Heminway, supra note 12. 
 18 In Bear Bailout, Fed Tried to Avoid a ‘Contagion,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/in-bear-bailout-fed-tried-to-avoid-a-
contagion/.  
 19 See Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing before the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Comm.), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts072309mls.htm; Feasibility of Systemic 
Risk Measurement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 2 
(2009) (statement of Prof. Andrew W. Lo), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/alo/www/Papers/testimony2009.pdf.  See also Enhancing Investor 
Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong 4, 8–9 (2009) (statement of Barbara Roper, Di-
rector of Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/Roper_Testimo
ny_Senate_Banking_3-26-09.pdf. 
 20 The Act describes a systemically significant financial institution as a domestic 
or foreign “nonbank financial company” whose “material financial distress . . . or the 
nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or [the] mix of 
[whose] activities . . . [may] pose a threat to the financial stability of the United 
States.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 113 (2010).  Prior to the promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Act, commenta-
tors expressed varying descriptions of the characteristics of “systemically significant” 
institutions.  For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, one of the twelve 
regional Reserve Banks in the Reserve Bank System, explained that, at a very basic 
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This Essay explores significant financial institutions’ efforts to 
withstand the threats of systemic risk during the Great Recession.  
This Essay examines each of the three phases of the recent financial 
crisis: crisis management, diagnosing the dilemma, and divining a 
cure to prevent future crises.  Finally, this Essay introduces the con-
tributions of authors who presented reflections at Seton Hall Law Re-
view’s symposium, the Future of Financial Markets Regulation.  The 
ensuing discussion enriches the analysis of the precipitating factors of 
the crisis that disrupted global financial markets and proposes market 
reforms designed to address these concerns. 
II. CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
The events that led to the recent financial crisis brewed for sev-
eral years prior to the summer of 2007.
21
  Some argue that two dec-
 
level, “systemically significant” could mean an institution whose “failure would have 
economically significant spillover effects which, if left unchecked, could destabilize 
the financial system and have a negative impact on the real economy.”  JAMES B. 
THOMSON, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS NO. 27, ON 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROGRESSIVE SYSTEMIC 
MITIGATION 1 (2009).  For other examples, see Steven Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. 
L. J. 193, 198–204 (2008); Timothy Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of 
N.Y., Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations Corporate Conference 2008: The 
Current Financial Challenges: Policy and Regulatory Implication (Mar. 6, 2008).  
The varying descriptions consistently note the importance of several factors in de-
termining that an institution is systemically significant, including size, concentration 
of financial interests, and participation in high risk activities. 
 21 Commentators point to many precipitating causes that foreshadowed the eco-
nomic crisis, beginning in the summer of 2007.  See, e.g., Matthew Beville et al., An 
Information Market Proposal for Regulating Systemic Risk, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 849, 852–56 
(2010).  Some point to the Federal Reserve’s decision to maintain the federal funds 
target rate, or the interest rate at which the Federal Reserve agrees to lend money to 
private depository institutions for short periods, at its lowest level in 45 years.  Id. at 
853.  See Robert Higgs, Cumulating Policy Consequences, Frightened Overreactions, and the 
Current Surge of Government’s Size, Scope, and Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 531, 543 
(2010).  Responding to the market bubble that gave rise to internet and technology 
related securities, the Federal Reserve lowered the rate in 2001 from 6.5% to 1.75% 
and further reduced the rate to 1% in 2003.  Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank 
(Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/ 
general/2001/20011211/default.htm (lowering the rate to 1.75%); Press Release, 
Federal Reserve Bank (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/press/monetary/2003/20030625/default.htm (lowering the rate to 1%). 
Other events signaled the coming crisis.  In April of 2007, New Century Finan-
cial Corp., the largest independent provider of mortgage loans to borrowers with 
poor credit histories, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  New Century Files for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy, CNNMONEY, Apr. 3, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/02/ 
news/companies/new_century_bankruptcy.  Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Mortgage 
Lenders Network USA Inc., ResMae Mortgage Corp., and People’s Choice Home 
Loan all filed for bankruptcy in the first three months of 2007 in response to increas-
ing defaults on subprime mortgages.  See, e.g., Tiffany Kary, People’s Choice Home Loan 
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ades of deregulation eroded regulatory oversight of financial mar-
kets;
22
 the absence of oversight, commentators explain, led to con-
demnable practices such as predatory lending in the residential 
mortgage market.
23
  The lack of oversight also contributed to an envi-
ronment in which a shroud obscured financial engineers’ develop-
ment of complex structured products, such as credit derivatives.
24
  
These deregulatory policies coupled with the purposeful engineering 
of products that fell beyond the purview of regulation fueled the 
growth of high-risk financial products.
25
 
 
Files for Bankruptcy (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2007, 2:13 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=atkiRNcdlZ8M&refer
=home; Bradley Keoun, Mortgage Lenders Network Halts Loans as Housing Slows (Up-
date4), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2007, 6:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aTpglnM_rtRM&refer=home; Bradley Keoun and 
Jody Shenn, ResMae Seeks Bankruptcy; Credit Suisse to Buy Assets (Update5), BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 13, 2007, 7:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=arsKNQcbPcxc&refer=home; see also Liz Moyer, Bad News Bear, 
FORBES.COM (Aug. 6, 2007, 4:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/06/ 
debt-bear-stearns-biz-wall-cx_lm_0806bear.html. 
 22 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 55–60; Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk 
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1327, 1333–1334, (2009); see also André Douglas Pond Cummings, Still “Ain’t No Glory 
in Pain”: How the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated 
The Market Crash of 2002, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 467, 469–77 (2007); Frank 
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2007). 
 23 See Daniel Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Develop-
ment, and the Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 470 (2009) (describing the 
lack of regulation and the failure of Congress to adopt recommendations submitted 
in a joint report from the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development). 
 24 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 55–60 (explaining that, as the credit default swap 
market grew and creditors gained access to instruments that reduced their exposure 
to debtors’ defaults, creditors relaxed their due diligence investigations and conti-
nuous debtor monitoring practices).  The growth of the credit default swaps led 
some market participants began to perceive credit default swap agreements as an ab-
solute guarantee against risk of loss and, therefore, they adopted less disciplined risk 
management processes and exposed themselves to excessive levels of risk.  Id. at 2–3. 
 25 Describing the origins of the liquidity crisis that began in 2007, a Congressional 
Report notes that securitization allowed mortgage lenders to bypass traditional 
banks. 
Securitization pools mortgages or other debts and sells them to inves-
tors in the form of bonds rather than leaving loans on the lenders’ bal-
ance sheets. . . . [Mortgage backed securities market (“MBS”)] were 
popular with investors and banks because [they] allowed both to better 
diversify their portfolios. But because the MBS market was growing ra-
pidly in size an sophistication, accurate pricing of its risk was difficult 
and could have been distorted by the housing boom.  
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Securitization, an underwriting process involving securities is-
sued to investors for investments in bundled pools of debt instru-
ments, such as residential mortgages or other asset-backed lending 
arrangements, offered a new source of investment opportunities.
26
  In 
the securitization process special purpose entities (SPEs), also re-
ferred to as special investment vehicles, issued equity or debt securi-
ties to investors to raise capital in order to invest in traditional debt 
products and nascent high-risk structured financial products.
27
   
The SPEs typically purchased debt investments secured by colla-
teral such as mortgage-backed loan obligations or other collateralized 
debt obligations.
28
  Managers of SPEs earned fees for identifying and 
developing portfolios of mortgage loans.
29
  The interests in the SPEs 
entitled shareholders to receive income from the cash flows generat-
ed by the SPEs’ debt investments.30  In some instances, these invest-
ments included only certain loans identified within a pool of debt in-
struments.31  Market participants referred to the division of a pool of 
debt instruments or asset-backed securities as tranches.
32
  The invest-
ment managers of the SPEs evaluated the collateralized debt securi-
ties and other investment opportunities in order to offer investors 
positive returns and diversified investment strategies.
33
   
Two critical issues converged during the crisis.  First, the SPEs 
divided the debt pools into tranches, allowing investors to gain expo-
sure to the varying levels of default risk represented in each pool of 
debt obligations.  Despite the fact that the borrowers in each pool of 
debt investments had strikingly different risk-of-default profiles, cre-
dit ratings agencies assigned similar ratings to the pools or agreed to 
other policies that resulted in erroneous ratings of the risk-of-default 
 
DARRYL E. GETTER, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FINANCIAL CRISIS? THE LIQUIDITY 
CRUNCH OF AUGUST 2007, 8 (2007), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34182_20070921.pdf.  
 26 See id. 
 27 Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 221. 
 28 Id.  See also Raymond Brescia, Capital in Chaos, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and 
the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 290 (2008).   
 29 Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 221.   
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.  
 32 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1316 
(2009); see also Immergluck, supra note 23, at 448.  For a description of CDOs and 
their role in the mortgage crisis, see infra notes 41–42. 
 33 Brescia, supra note 28, at 291.   
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for the entire tranche.
34
  Second, SPEs and significant financial insti-
tutions adopted proprietary risk analysis models and these models er-
roneously underestimated the probability of a decline in housing 
prices.
35
  The collapse of Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. (Bear Stearns) 
illustrates the convergence of these critical issues. 
A. Lions and Tigers and Bears Stearns, Oh My! 
In the summer of 2007, with an eighty-five year operating histo-
ry, Bear Stearns was a diversified financial services holding company.36  
Bear Stearns core lines of business included the origination, distribu-
tion, and trading of equity and fixed income securities, investment 
banking, global clearing services, asset management, and private 
client services.
37
  Bear Stearns was one of the most prominent invest-
ment banks in the United States with offices on Madison Avenue in 
New York City and a significant international market participant with 
offices in London’s Docklands.
38
 
In the decade prior to the summer of 2007, the market for fi-
nancial products related to residential mortgage-backed or asset-
backed securities grew rapidly.
39
  Bear Stearns’ business became in-
creasingly engaged in the securitization or the consolidation, packag-
ing, and sale of interests in residential mortgages, real estate financ-
ings, and other collateralized debt obligations through SPEs.
40
 
In the months leading to the summer of 2007, collateralized 
debt obligations, or CDOs, became increasingly popular.
41
  Two Bear 
 
 34 See U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN 
THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 7–9 (July, 8 
2008), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf. 
 35 See Systemic Risk: Regulatory Oversight and Recent Initiatives to Address Risk Posed by 
Credit Default Swaps: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts, Ins., and Gov’t Spon-
sored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 13–14 (2009) (statement of 
Orice M. Williams, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d09397t.pdf. 
 36 GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS AND “RESCUE” FOR A 
MAJOR PROVIDER OF MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS 2 (2008), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34420_20080326.pdf. 
 37 Id. 
 38 BEAR STEARNS ANNUAL REPORT 2006 (Mar. 31, 2007). 
 39 Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1254 
(2010).  
 40 Alistair Barr, Bear Stearns Bailed Out by Fed, J.P. Morgan, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 14, 
2008, 5:16 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bear-stearns-goes-on-life-
support-as-trading-crisis-turns-dire. 
 41 Investors perceived investments in CDOs as low risk because the securities were 
backed by residential mortgage loans, and incorporated a diversified risk structure.  
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Stearns hedge funds, the Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit 
Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund and a related fund (the “funds”), 
created portfolios that invested in credit investment strategies involv-
ing CDO products.
42
  Commentators reported that Bear Stearns in-
vestments in the CDO market were highly leveraged. According to 
commentators,  
Bear Stearns’s enhanced fund, which at its peak borrowed 10 
times its equity, and the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Cre-
dit Strategies Fund, a similar pool that wasn’t as highly leveraged, 
speculated mostly in collateralized debt obligations, securities that 
mostly [held] pieces of junk-rated corporate bonds, mortgage 
bonds, high-interest loans, derivatives or even other CDOs.
43 
By the end of the summer of 2007, Bear Stearns’ strong presence in 
these markets became an albatross, ominously circling the storied fi-
nancial institution.
44
 
While the losses on CDOs and other credit strategies began in 
2006, it was during the early months of 2007 that Bear Stearns ac-
knowledged that the funds, worth an estimated $1.5 billion at the end 
of 2006, had lost significant value.
45
  As of April of 2007, the funds 
had lost 23% of their value.
46
  By the beginning of the summer of 
2007, Bear Stearns announced its intention to suspend redemptions 
of the funds’ shares, meaning that the funds rejected investors’ re-
 
See Immergluck, supra note 23, at 462.  (stating that CDOs “peeled apart” various 
types and degrees of risk, thereby allocating risk to different classes of investors de-
pending on their appetite and tolerance for different sorts of risk).  “[I]nvestors who 
would not invest in a pass-through security backed by loans exhibiting anything but 
the lowest default risks or were likely to prepay could invest in a bond that was de-
signed to be highly secure.”  Id.  In 2006, sales of CDOs reached $503 billion.  Jody 
Shenn & Bradley Keoun, Bear Stearns Rivals Reject Fund Bailout in LTCM Redux (Up-
date3), BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2007, 11:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aYDTeHYnV3ms [hereinafter Shenn & 
Keoun, Bear Stearns Rivals]. 
 42 CDOs are secured credit investment products.  For an in-depth description 
and analysis of CDOs, see generally Johnson, supra note 6.   
 43 Shenn & Keoun, Bear Stearns Rivals, supra note 41. 
 44 Andrew Clark, Bear Stearns Shares Plummet as it Seeks Emergency Funding, 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ 
2008/mar/14/creditcrunch.useconomy.  
 45 See Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds Are Worth Little, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/ 
business/18bond.html.  
 46 Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 21, 2007, at C1. 
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quests to redeem shares.
47
  Notwithstanding the rapidly declining val-
ue of their investments in the funds, Bear Stearns refused to return 
the remaining value of their investments in the funds.
48
  During the 
week of June 11, 2007, concerns escalated regarding the liquidity of 
the two funds.
49
  The market lost confidence in the funds’ ability to 
satisfy their debt obligations and maintain sufficient operating capi-
tal.
50
 
In addition to mounting losses, the two Bear Stearns funds faced 
demands from creditors for additional collateral as insurance against 
the funds’ default on their obligations.
51
  On June 21, 2007, Merrill 
Lynch & Co., Inc. (Merrill Lynch) and Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche 
Bank) seized over $900 million in assets that the creditors held as col-
lateral in connection with Bear Stearns funds’ outstanding debt obli-
gations.
52
  Merrill Lynch threatened to auction the Bear Stearns’ as-
sets held in its custody as collateral for the funds’ repayment of their 
obligations.
53
 
An auction to liquidate the assets or the collateral held by the 
funds’ counterparties presented several disconcerting issues for Bear 
Stearns and other large financial institutions.  The rise in foreclosures 
reduced the value of mortgage-backed securities related to those debt 
obligations.  In addition, prior to the crisis, market participants calcu-
lated the prices for these obscure assets using proprietary quantitative 
models.
54
  Initiating an auction heightened concerns regarding sys-
temic risk.  An auction threatened to reveal conflicts in the privately 
determined prices and force market-wide recognition of differences 
in market participants’ valuation of the securities.
55
  An auction that 
revealed a public market price of the investments could trigger the 
 
 47 See Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Subprime Bath, BUSINESSWEEK (June 12, 
2007, 6:15 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/ 
jun2007/db20070612_748264.htm. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Bajaj & Creswell, supra note 46. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See GETTER, supra note 25, at 5 (“[A]ccurate pricing of [the risk related to in-
vestments the mortgage-backed securities market] was difficult and could have been 
distorted by the housing boom.”). 
 55 Bajaj & Creswell, supra note 46 (reporting that Merrill Lynch quietly displayed 
seized assets to a small group of potential buyers in an effort to keep the pricing of 
the securities under wraps and avoid marking down their own stakes).   
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need for systemically significant institutions that held the same secur-
ities to revise their valuations of these securities. 
In July of 2007, the funds became insolvent and filed for bank-
ruptcy.
56
  Bear Stearns escaped bankruptcy for nearly another year.
57
  
The losses that Bear Stearns experienced in the summer of 2007, 
however, marked the beginning of the public revelation of tumult in 
the market for credit derivatives and mortgage and other asset-
backed securities.
58
  In March of 2008, rumors spread rapidly that 
Bear Stearns faced a significant liquidity crisis
59
 and had failed in its 
efforts to obtain a $2 billion short-term loan.
60
  Senior management at 
Bear Stearns adamantly denied the rumors regarding the firm’s de-
clining condition, but the denials were insufficient to assuage the 
fears of the firm’s counterparties.
61
 
Movement in the prices for credit default swap agreements that 
referenced Bear Stearns’ debt obligations signaled market partici-
pants’ perception that Bear Stearns would likely default on its debt 
obligations or announce the firm’s insolvency.
62
  Credit default swaps 
are insurance-like arrangements that allow creditors to transfer some 
or all of their exposure to a debtor’s default on a particular debt in-
strument identified in the agreement.63  Prices for credit default swap 
agreements “represent the size of the premium paid by the buyer of 
protection” and “change over time based on supply and demand for 
particular [credit default swap] contracts.”
64
  The spreads in the pre-
miums for credit default swap agreements “are analogous to insur-
ance premiums and similarly reflect market participants’ assessment 
of the risk of a default” by the entity referred to in the credit default 
swap.
65
 
According to commentators, the premiums for credit default 
swap agreement spreads on contracts that offered protection against 
Bear Stearns’ default increased in July of 2007, “reflecting the in-
 
 56 Francesco Guerrera, JPMorgan to Buy Bear Stearns for $236m, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2206ed2-f380-11dc-b6bc-0000779fd2ac.html. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Kara Scannell, Credit Crisis: SEC Comes Under Criticism in Light of Bear Woes, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A6. 
 59 SHORTER, supra note 36, at 1. 
 60 Id. at 3.  
 61 Id. at 3–4. 
 62 Mark Flannery et al., Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Rat-
ings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2101 (2010).  
 63 Johnson, supra note 6, at 20–23. 
 64 Mark Flannery et al., supra note 62, at 2088. 
 65 Id.  
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creased perceived risk of default.”
66
  As commentators note, credit de-
fault swap spreads for “Bear Stearns increased by more than those of 
the other investment banks,” during the period when defaults on 
higher risk mortgages increased.  The spreads in the credit default 
swap market for contracts that referenced Bear Stearns’ debt in-
creased, indicating market participants’ perception that “Bear 
Stearns had more exposure to risk in the subprime market” and was 
therefore, more likely to default on its debt obligations.
67
 
After failed efforts to increase the company’s liquidity, including 
an unprecedented offer by the Federal Reserve to open the discount 
window to Bear Stearns,
68
 on March 16, 2008, JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
(JP Morgan) agreed to purchase Bear Stearns in a stock-for-stock 
transaction for the price of $2 per share.
69
  Bear Stearns’ near col-
lapse, however, presented only one of several instances during the re-
cent crisis in which the federal government and private market partic-
ipants responded to the threat of the demise of a systemically 
significant financial institution.
70
 
 
 66 Id. at 2101. 
 67 Id.  
 68 During the crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) interpreted its authority as 
to allow short term credit extensions secured by collateral to eligible depository insti-
tutions.  SHORTER, supra note 36, at 4.  As explained in a recent congressional report, 
the Federal Reserve understood its authority to include the ability to  
make direct short-term loans to commercial banks.  A 1932 provision of 
the Federal Reserve Act allow[ed] it to lend to non-banks if at least five 
of its seven governors approve, a provision that has not been used since 
the Great Depression. . . .  The arrangement would involve providing 
collateral-based financing to Bear through JP Morgan, which would be 
used as a conduit, since as a commercial bank it already has access to 
the discount window and is also under the Fed’s supervision. . . .  JP 
Morgan would have incurred no risk from the transaction but the Fed 
would [have incurred risk]. 
Id.   
 69 Guerrera, supra note 56.  Bear Stearns shares had traded at $170 in January of 
2008 and as high as $30 per share the week before the sale to JP Morgan.  Id. 
 70 Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 16, at 469–70.  
Starting with the bailout of Bear Stearns in early 2008, . . . governmen-
tal bodies and their leaders were prominently involved in the negotia-
tions and the ultimate resolution of each major non-bank financial in-
stitution that encountered financial distress.  The government 
arranged outcomes on an ad-hoc basis, with varying degrees of taxpay-
er support.  In the Bear Stearns case, taxpayer funds facilitated a mer-
ger.  In the AIG case, the Federal Reserve made a substantial direct 
loan to the company.  With Lehman Brothers, the government de-
clined to offer any money, and the company ultimately filed for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy. 
Id. 
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B. Trouble at Lehman Brothers 
On September 15, 2008, after a steep decline in the company’s 
stock price and reductions in its credit ratings, Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, Inc. (Lehman Brothers) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection.
71
  Lehman Brothers’ filing marked the largest bankruptcy 
in U.S. history and severely undermined consumer confidence in the 
stability of capital and credit markets.
72
  Lehman Brothers’ bankrupt-
cy illustrates the tension that the government faced as concerns in-
creased regarding liquidity in credit markets in 2008.
73
  The govern-
ment had the choice to offer rescue loans to non-banking 
institutions, such as Lehman Brothers and other failing systemically 
significant institutions, or face the risk that any of these institutions 
might become insolvent and trigger a domino effect of losses across 
financial markets. 
After the government’s refusal to offer financing to prevent 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the crisis of confidence escalated, 
threatening the stability of the entire financial services industry.
74
  As 
the casualties mounted, JP Morgan acquired Washington Mutual, Inc. 
(Washington Mutual) buying the business out of receivership from 
the FDIC.
75
  Washington Mutual, when placed into receivership by 
the Office of Thrift Supervision, was the largest bank failure in the 
history of the United States.
76
  Wachovia Corporation
77
 and Merrill 
Lynch
78
 relinquished their status as independent investment banks, 
 
 71 Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/52098fa2-82e3-11dd-907e-000077b07658.html. 
 72 Id.  
 73 See Matt Phillips, Wall Street’s ‘Window Dressing’: Lehman’s Accidental Historian, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2010, at B1. 
 74 Professors Ayotte and Skeel argue that allowing failing firms to enter into the 
bankruptcy process offers a better solution to the concerns of financial contagion 
than the governments’ ad hoc approach.  Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 16, at 471.  The 
use of rescue loans in the recent crisis “increased uncertainty, increased costs of 
moral hazard, and dampened the incentive of private actors to resolve distress before 
the ‘day of reckoning’ arose.”  Id. 
 75 Eric Dash, JPMorgan Builds Strength with WaMu Deal in Tense Age, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 26, 2008, at C1. 
 76 Robin Sidel et al., WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in 
U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.  
 77 Michael J. de la Merced, Regulators Approve Wells Fargo Takeover of Wachovia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at B1.  On December 31, 2008, Wells Fargo’s purchase of Wa-
chovia closed averting a government-led sell off of the bank.  Press Release, Wells 
Fargo, Wells Fargo and Wachovia Merger Completed (Jan. 1, 2009), available at 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2009/20090101_Wachovia_Merger. 
 78 Eric Dash, Purchase of Merrill Fulfills Quest for a Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008.  
On September 15, 2008, Bank of America announced its intentions to acquire Mer-
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and Wells Fargo and Bank of America, respectively, acquired these 
freshly-minted bank holding companies.
79
 
Facing an unprecedented credit and liquidity environment, 
firms combined, announced their insolvency, or accepted aid from 
the government.  In each case, the outcomes had tremendous conse-
quences for the firms and the national economy.
80
  Some commenta-
tors argued that extending aid stirred concerns that the government 
would act as a deep pocket for many failing financial institutions and 
heightened the risk of moral hazard.
81
   
The scholars’ contributions in this volume offer comments on 
the origins and genesis of the crisis, the government and private sec-
tors’ responses to the crisis, and concerns regarding financial markets 
regulations that continue to receive insufficient national and interna-
tional attention. The scholars’ contributions highlight the mechan-
isms pursuant to which we may develop a true balm for the tragedies 
that transpired in the financial markets during the recent crisis and 
to prevent such events from recurring in the future. 
III. DIAGNOSING THE DILEMMA AND DIVINING A CURE 
Cries for regulatory reform rose loudly in response to the events 
of the crisis.  Many also expressed concerns that federal government 
aid would lead to moral hazard—systemically significant financial in-
stitutions’ use of excessive leverage based upon assumptions that the 
government would act as a guarantor and bail them out if they expe-
rienced large losses.82  In response to the demands for regulatory 
reform, the government adopted a number of legislative measures 
 
rill Lynch & Co, Inc., one of the nation’s largest investment banking and wealth 
management businesses with over 20,000 brokers and several trillion dollars in 
clients’ assets.  Id.  Merrill Lynch was the world’s largest brokerage firm prior to the 
acquisition.  Id. 
 79 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 80 This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2009), 
available at http://www.abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=7200273&page=4 (In-
terview by George Stephanopoulos of Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Secretary) 
(explaining that the federal agencies were “caught between these terrible choices of 
letting Lehman fail . . . or coming in and putting huge amounts of taxpayer dollars at 
risk, like we did at AIG”). 
 81 Edmund Andrews, A ‘Moral Hazard’ for a Housing Bailout: Sorting the Victims From 
Those Who Volunteered, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/02/23/business/23housing.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.   
 82 Todd Zywicki & Joseph Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 58 (2009).  See also Richard Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts 
of Interest and Ethics when Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 156 
(2009) (stating that “[g]overnment could respond to the moral hazard problem by 
imposing risk management regulation on firms that receive bailouts”).   
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and commissioned regulatory agencies to draft and enforce well-
tailored rules to oversee systemically significant financial institutions.83 
Scholars exploring concerns regarding the government’s ap-
proach to regulation during the crisis critique the results of the gov-
ernment’s intervention.
84
  Other scholars posit that issues that remain 
unresolved after the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act deserve careful 
consideration.
85
  These scholars consider regulation through a 
unique lens and offer important contributions aimed to divine a bet-
ter approach to regulate financial markets. 
Professor Michelle Harner explores the role of enterprise risk 
management (“ERM”) as one of the central concerns in the recent 
financial crisis.
86
  According to Professor Harner, ERM involves a 
comprehensive approach to managing risk.
87
  ERM offers a “tech-
nique for firm-wide risk identification, assessment and response [to 
enterprise risk] that involves the board of directors, senior manage-
ment, and appropriate individuals throughout the firm.”
88
  Professor 
Harner explores shareholder litigation challenging Citigroup’s in-
vestment decisions and risk management practices in the period lead-
 
 83 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765-3933 (2008), empowered the Department of the Treasury to extend public fi-
nancing to failing businesses in the financial services industry.  The Troubled Asset 
Relief Program and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115 (2009), were designed to engender an economic stimulus.  See The Re-
covery Act, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx (last 
visited September 21, 2010).  The Department of Treasury’s Capital Assistance and 
Public-Private Investment Programs were designed to restore confidence in the na-
tion’s largest depository institutions. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY 
REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 104(G) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008, QUARTER ENDING MAR. 31, 2009, at 51 (2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/FSOB/FINSOB-Qrtly-Rpt-033109.pdf.  Final-
ly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 919 (2010), addresses oversight of systemic risk across domestic capital 
and credit markets, the orderly liquidation of a failing systemically significant finan-
cial institution, the transfer of power from the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of Currency, the roles of federal agencies that supervise sig-
nificant financial markets or significant financial market participants, including the 
Federal Deposit Institution Corporation and the Federal Reserve Bank, the regula-
tion of hedge fund advisers, the creation of a federal insurance regulation agency, 
the regulation of bank holding companies and depository institutions, the regulation 
of the over-the-counter derivatives markets, and the creation of a Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau.  Id.   
 84 See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 12; see also Verret, supra note 12. 
 85 See Harner, supra note 9; Kaal & Painter, supra note 10; Chaffee, supra note 15; 
Fairfax, supra note 11. 
 86 See Harner, supra note 9. 
 87 Id. at 1331–33. 
 88 Id. at 1365. 
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ing to the recent financial crisis.89  Even when companies implement 
comprehensive ERM programs, Professor Harner argues that cultural 
and structural biases, including individual and cognitive biases and 
corporate cultural norms, present barriers to the most well-
intentioned risk management programs.
90
   
As Professor Harner observes, enterprise risk management is a 
critical component in any firm’s ability to shield itself from poor in-
vestments and bad business decisions.
91
  Many scholars, regulators, 
and corporate governance specialists were surprised to learn that, 
prior to the crisis, systemically significant banking and financial insti-
tutions relied almost exclusively on quantitative risk management 
models in their decision-making process.
92
  Professor Harner posits 
that managers relying on these models failed to acknowledge the in-
fluence that cognitive biases and cultural norms had on the assump-
tions that constitute the basic architecture of these models.
93
  Profes-
sor Harner argues that regulatory reform should incorporate 
consideration of these limitations to effective enterprise and systemic 
risk management.
94
 
In addition to concerns regarding cognitive and cultural biases 
and the limitations of quantitative risk models, other scholars’ reflec-
tions encourage regulators to create reforms that enhance policies 
governing the relationship between shareholders and managers.  
These scholars highlight the important role of shareholders in corpo-
 
 89 Id. at 1343–49. 
 90 See id. at 1350; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
 91 See Harner, supra note 9, at 1365. 
 92 See RISK & INS. MGMT. SOC’Y, INC., THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS: A WAKE-UP CALL 
FOR ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 5 (Bill Coffin ed., 2009), available at 
www.RIMS.org/ERMwhitepaper.  RIMS faults overreliance on historic controls and 
risk metrics for some of the losses experienced during the 2008 recession.  Id.  Ac-
cording to RIMS,  “[t]here was a failure to embed enterprise risk management best 
practices from the top all the way down to the trading floor, with the mistaken as-
sumption that there is only one way to view a particular risk.”  Id. at 7.  See also Joe 
Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24 (discussing flaws in re-
lying solely on VaR and noting that, in the context of the 2008 recession, “[i]nstead 
of scrutinizing VaR for signs of impending trouble, they took comfort in a number 
and doubled down, putting more money at risk in the expectation of bigger gains”). 
 93 See Harner, supra note 9, at 1338; see also Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Gover-
nance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN. MARKET TRENDS, Feb. 2009, at 2, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf. (“The risk management sys-
tems have failed in many cases due to corporate governance procedures rather than 
the inadequacy of computer models alone: information about exposures in a num-
ber of cases did not reach the board and even senior levels of management, while 
risk management was often activity rather than enterprise-based.”). 
 94 Harner, supra note 9, at 1350. 
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rate governance.
95
  Notwithstanding the increased role of federal reg-
ulation in the sphere of corporate governance, critical issues relating 
to the quality of shareholder participation remain unresolved.
96
 
Professor Lisa Fairfax explores the intersection of technology 
and corporate governance in the context of electronic shareholder 
meetings.
97
  Professor Fairfax surveys the states that allow virtual par-
ticipation or remote-only participation for annual shareholders meet-
ings.
98
  Upon completing her survey of the various approaches to the 
question of electronic participation, Professor Fairfax concludes that 
the prevalence of discussions about virtual participation and electron-
ic meetings among state legislatures signals the significance of virtual 
alternatives to traditional shareholder participation.99 
Professor Fairfax notes that recently adopted state statutes allow-
ing virtual participation in annual shareholder meetings create na-
tional concerns regarding the impact of technology on traditional 
corporate governance practices.
100
  Supporters of virtual participation 
argue that virtual meetings are less expensive than in-person meet-
ings and may engender enhanced participation by engaging a broad-
er shareholder demographic.
101
  Electronic shareholder meetings of-
fer a cost savings by reducing the financial burden of hosting an in-
person annual shareholder meeting.
102
  In addition, hosting electron-
ic shareholder meetings allows corporations to enhance their image 
as technologically advanced firms and to create an advantage for 
adopters of virtual meetings in the competition to attract capital.
103
 
Opponents to the use of electronic shareholder meetings argue 
that electronic shareholder meetings reduce shareholder-
 
 95 See Fairfax, supra note 11. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id. at 1367.  Professor Fairfax further divides the category of “electronic 
shareholder meetings” into “remote shareholder participation” and “remote-only 
shareholder participation.”  Id. at 1368. 
 98 Id. at 1370–82.  
 99 See id. at 1368–70. 
 100 Id. at 1390–96.  
 101 Fairfax, supra note 11, at 1391–92.  See also Elizabeth Boros, Virtual Shareholder 
Meetings: Who Decides How Companies Make Decisions, MELB. U. L. REV. 265, 274 (2004); 
Remote Communications Laws Provide Alternative Format for Shareholder Meetings, CORP. 
COUNS. WKLY., June 20, 2007, at 188. 
 102 Id. at 1391.  
 103 Id. See Dan Birnhak, Online Shareholder Meetings: Corporate Law Anomalies or the 
Future of Governance, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 423, 428 (2003); see also Ga-
vin A. Beske, Shareholder Meetings Online, in SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LAW AND REGULATION 8–14 (John F. Olson & Carmen J. Law-
rence eds., 2002). 
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management interaction.
104
  Professor Fairfax explores shortcomings 
of electronic shareholder meetings including concerns that hosting 
remote-only meetings may permit managers to insulate themselves 
from shareholders.
105
  As a result managers may respond selectively to 
favorable questions posed virtually (via email)
106
 or only scripted res-
ponses to shareholder concerns.
107
  Critics of electronic participation 
also challenge the assumption that virtual participation and electron-
ic meetings are less expensive.  While initially the transition to elec-
tronic meetings may reduce the expense of the annual shareholder 
meeting, the need to adapt continuously to advances in technology 
will likely create recurring expenses for the firm.
108
  Moreover, there 
are, of course, concerns that arise directly from the use of technolo-
gy, such as the ability to verify shareholders’ identity and to assess and 
record shareholder votes accurately during a remote access only 
meeting.
109
 
Professors Wulf Kaal and Richard Painter explore weaknesses in 
the corporate governance policies of certain systemically significant 
institutions that contributed to the losses that these institutions expe-
rienced during the recent financial crisis.
110
  Through a comparison 
of liability standards for managers breach of fiduciary duties under 
American and German laws and an analysis of the cultural compo-
nents of undertaking risk, Professors Kaal and Painter explore differ-
ent jurisdictions’ approaches to evaluating a duty to manage business 
risks.
111
  While laws in both the United States and Germany offer a 
highly deferential presumption that directors act in good faith, on an 
informed basis, and in the best interest of shareholders, legislative 
proposals in Germany and changes to the interpretation of the appli-
cation of the business judgment rule suggests that German mangers 
may soon face personal liability for taking “inappropriately excessive” 
business risks. 
112
 
Comparing the costs of monitoring risk management with the 
adopted or proposed substantive and procedural rules for directors’ 
duty to monitor risk, Professors Kaal and Painter explore divergences 
 
 104 Fairfax, supra note 11, at 1392. 
 105 Id. at 1392–93.  
 106 Id. at 1393. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Birnhak, supra note 103, at 439. 
 109 See CORP. COUNS. WKLY supra note 101, at 188; see also Boros, supra note 101. 
 110 Kaal & Painter, supra note 10, at 1433. 
 111 See Kaal & Painter, supra note 10. 
 112 Id. at 1465. 
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between the approach adopted in the United States and the ap-
proach to fiduciary duty adopted in Germany.113  Through litigation 
arising out of the financial crisis, Professors Kaal and Painter illu-
strate the weaknesses of imposing stricter fiduciary standards in even 
an enhanced disclosure regime.
114
 
The United States disclosure regime seemingly failed to assist in 
detecting excess risk taking at large financial institutions.  The ab-
sence of comprehensive industry oversight and the concentration of 
risks among a small group of large financial institutions in the mar-
kets for exotic products, such as CDOs and credit default swaps, 
linked the financial health of systemically significant financial institu-
tions.
115
  Many of these transactions were so complex that investors 
did not appreciate the impact of the disclosed risks or the limitations 
of disclosure.
116
  Professors Kaal and Painter conclude that more ef-
fective disclosure requirements and heightened corporate gover-
nance measures create the teeth necessary to enforce shareholder 
rights with respect to risk management.
117
  Professors Kaal and Painter 
qualify their findings by noting that continuing investigations into the 
causes of the crisis and the reforms implemented in response will in-
form their ultimate conclusions regarding risk management and di-
rectors and officers’ duties to monitor the same.118 
Other commentators explore the role of the federal government 
as a creditor and a shareholder.  Professor Heminway examines the 
federal government’s bail-out of failing institutions through capital 
investment—the government’s decision to become a shareholder in 
private for-profit businesses.
119
  Through emergency use of their au-
thority to designate a preferred series of stock, or their “blank check” 
authority, directors quickly gained access to federal funds.
120
  The 
 
 113 Id. at 1445. 
 114 Id. at 1436–37 
 115 See id. at 1433–38. 
 116 Id. at 1473. 
 117 Kaal & Painter, supra note 10, at 1484–85. 
 118 Id. at 1438. 
 119 See Heminway, supra note 12, at 1487–88. 
 120 Id. at 1490–95.  The blank check authority captured in section 151 of the De-
laware General Corporation Law allows corporations to designate and issue pre-
ferred stock.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2010); see also Heminway, supra note 12, 
at 1490–91.  All corporations incorporated in Delaware have the authority through 
blank check provisions to issue preferred stock with voting rights, preferences in div-
idends and options or other special rights appealing to the party receiving the issued 
securities.  Heminway, supra note 12, at 1490 n.12.  Corporations also have the au-
thority to designate different series of preferred stock to obtain equity financing 
without amending their charter, as they do each time they intend to issue preferred 
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boards of directors of several of the companies that received federal 
aid in exchange for preferred shares adopted a broad interpretation 
of their authority under the relevant provisions of their certificates of 
incorporation to issue preferred stock.
121
  While this broad interpreta-
tion of the “blank check” authority was useful during the crisis to 
forge public-private partnerships to prevent the insolvency of systemi-
cally significant financial institutions, Professor Heminway notes that 
continuing to employ a broad interpretation of directors’ “blank 
check” authority creates concerns about directors’ potential abuse of 
this authority in future non-emergent situations.
122
 
 In addition, Professor Heminway explores the federal govern-
ment’s efforts to regulate through intervention in bankruptcy reor-
ganizations.
123
  Examining the Chrysler and General Motors bank-
ruptcies under § 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Professor 
Heminway contends that the government’s efforts to save the auto-
makers may disrupt established practices for assigning priority in fu-
ture bankruptcy transactions.
124
  These approaches create the poten-
tial for future abuse of directors’ “blank check” authority and 
uncertainty regarding priority in certain bankruptcy proceedings.  
Professor Verret examines the Troubled Asset Relief Program125 
(TARP) and the government’s decision to obtain a significant in-
vestment interest in several prominent publicly traded companies.
126
  
Professor Verret explores the possible impact of government owner-
ship in private businesses.  In particular, he examines the ability of 
political activists to influence private businesses through the govern-
ment’s role as a shareholder.
127
  Professor Verret raises questions re-
garding political activists’ ability to exert influence over private en-
terprises through their influence on government actors and 
policies.
128
 
 
stock.  Id. at 1491–92.  During the recent financial crisis, each of the largest reci-
pients of federal funds, AIG, Bank of America, and Citigroup, issued shares to the 
United States Government.  Id. at 1492.  Each transaction was unique because of dis-
tinctions in their certificates of incorporation.  See id. 
 121 Heminway, supra note 12, at 1493–94.  
 122 Id. at 1516–18.  
 123 Id. at 1505–13. 
 124 See id. at 1508–11.  
 125 The Troubled Asset Relief Program and the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 126 Verret, supra note 12, at 1522–28. 
 127 Id. at 1537–52. 
 128 Id. at 1552–55. 
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Professor Verret offers an interesting lens through which one 
may view public choice theory and the question of rent seeking.129  
Understanding rent seeking as a two-step process, Professor Verret 
describes the means by which government-controlled firms are likely 
to use their politically conferred rents to subsidize transfers to inter-
est groups.
130
  After examining the remedial constraints of administra-
tive law, Professor Verret posits that the TARP Recipient Trust Act 
may offer a reasonable mechanism for limiting the influence of polit-
ical interest groups.
131
 
Still other commentators examine the international cooperation 
that may be necessary to effectuate the promises Congressional res-
ponses to the crisis embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act.
132
  Professor Er-
ic Chaffee’s contribution invites financial reformers to explore har-
monization and centralization of international securities laws as a 
preventative tool for avoiding the next financial crisis.
133
  Fragmented 
regulation, according to Professor Chaffee, encourages a “race-to-the-
bottom.”
134
  Professor Chaffee posits that institutional and retail inves-
tors’ willingness to shop for opportunities beyond American shores 
evidences the shifting assumptions regarding the preeminence of 
American law in international financial services markets.
135
  This tran-
sition occurred, according to Professor Chaffee, in part, because of 
consolidation among international securities exchanges, and in part 
because of the increasing size and sophistication of securities markets 
outside of the United States.
136
  The aggressively litigious culture of 
American shareholders, the culture of enforcement, and the adop-
tion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, further alienated U.S. capital 
markets from global investors.
137
 
Professor Chaffee introduces six models of international securi-
ties law that may address global financial market concerns such as sys-
 
 129 See id. 
 130 Id. at 1521. 
 131 Id. at 1566–77. 
 132 See Chaffee, supra note 15. 
 133 Id. at 1584. 
 134 Id. at 1583 (citing Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft 
Law in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 946–47 (2009) (“[P]atchwork 
regulation does not work to regulate the emerging global markets, because it gene-
rates  a race-to-the-bottom in which nations ratchet down their systems of regulation 
and enforcement to suboptimal levels in an attempt to gain competitive advantage 
over other nations”)). 
 135 Id. at 1589–90.  
 136 Id.  
 137 Id. at 1590. 
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temic risk—privatization, competition, convergence, mutual recogni-
tion, harmonization, and centralization.
138
  Of the six models, only 
two—harmonization and centralization—offer a truly effective long-
term remedy.
139
  Professor Chaffee suggests that markets would bene-
fit from harmonized securities laws.  Harmonization creates a gateway 
for other international market reforms such as a centralized global 
securities regulator with robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforce-
ment powers.
140
  Without such harmonization, gaps or differences in 
regulation between and among nations make it possible for market 
participants to shift activities from a jurisdiction with an explicit pro-
hibition and ready enforcement regime to other jurisdictions with 
less explicit regulation or lighter touch enforcement.
141
  Harmoniza-
tion and centralization of international securities law have the bene-
fits of minimizing risk in the emerging global capital marketplace,
142
 
increasing market efficiency by reducing transaction costs, increasing 
investor confidence,
143
 and pooling the technical and financial exper-
tise and experience of securities regulators.
144
 
Arguments against harmonization and centralization often point 
to the challenges posed by the autonomy and independence of na-
tional regulators.
145
  Opponents also argue that regulatory competi-
tion creates intangible benefits, including the benefits of inspiring a 
diverse array of approaches to regulatory questions.
146
  In response, 
Professor Chaffee explains that any gains from regulatory competi-
tion are outweighed by the costs of satisfying regulatory standards in a 
fragmented global regulatory environment where market participants 
expend money and time to comply with many jurisdictions’ regulato-
ry expectations.
147
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The recent financial crisis illustrates many concerns raised by 
economists and other theorists regarding asset bubbles.  The reflec-
 
 138 Chaffee, supra note 15, at 1595–1603. 
 139 Id. at 1603. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. at 1583 (citing Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commis-
sion, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 39 (1999)). 
 142 Id. at 1603. 
 143 Id. at 1606. 
 144 Chaffee, supra note 15, at 1610. 
 145 Id. at 1614–17. 
 146 Id. at 1614. 
 147 Id. at 1614–15. 
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tions shared at the symposium offer insight regarding the cultural 
and cognitive limitations company management and federal regula-
tors faced when attempting to evaluate risks.  The reflections also of-
fer a comparison of responses in different jurisdictions.  The reflec-
tions highlight concerns regarding shareholders’ ability to influence 
risk management or other corporate governance matters.  The dis-
concerting events of the crisis present an opportunity to engage in a 
discourse to develop, implement, and enforce effective reform.   
